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RESUMEN
El uso de crédito comercial como forma de financiar el corto plazo ha aumentando en  los  últimos  años,  las  grandes
empresas utilizan más días del que necesitan para realizar los pagos a las pequeñas empresas,  lo  que  provoca  fatales
consecuencias financieras para los proveedores. Estos problemas financieros no son  nuevos,  pero  con  la  restricción
pronunciada del crédito los  problemas  se  agudizan  debido  a  que  el  uso  masivo  del  crédito  comercial  repercute
negativamente en los proveedores cuya insolvencia y riesgo de quiebra aumentan. En este trabajo se revisan de  forma
descriptiva el uso del crédito comercial en la crisis crediticia. Las principales contribuciones de la  ponencia  son  dos.
En primer lugar, mostrar las consecuencias financieras por la utilización del crédito comercial y, concretamente, en  la
crisis crediticia, y cómo el gobierno de  Reino  Unido  desarrolla  políticas  públicas  de  pago  para  reducir  el  efecto
negativo de los impagados. En segundo lugar, estudiar y comparar la situación de los países europeos en  términos  de
pago a los proveedores y, en particular, el caso de Reino Unido, pero también el caso Español.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Crisis crediticia, Crédito Comercial, Proveedores, Iniciativas sobre Políticas de Pago.
ABSTRACT
The use of trade credit as a short-term financing is increasing in the last years; large firms use more days to pay  small
firms than they need, which causes financial fatal consequences to suppliers. These financial  problems  are  not  new,
but with the credit crunch they are coming up  because  the  massive  use  of  the  trade  credit  impacts  negatively  on
suppliers whose insolvency and bankruptcy risks increase. In this paper we review  in  a  descriptive  way  the  use  of
trade credit  in  the  credit  crunch.  The  main  contributions  of  the  paper  are  two.  Firstly,  we  show  the  financial
consequences of the use of trade credit, and specifically  in  credit  crisis,  and  how  UK  government  develop  public
payment policies to reduce the negative effect of delete payments. Secondly, we study and  compare  the  situation  of
European countries in terms of payment to suppliers, and in particular the case of UK, but also Spanish case.
KEYWORDS: Credit Crunch, Trade Credit, Suppliers, Payment Policy Initiative.
1. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, the credit crunch and economy downturn financial problems of companies  increase  in  terms  of
liquidity. The consequences of financial restrictions prompted by credit crisis enhance the firms’ cash flow  problems,
principally because they do not get their money when they are expected to obtain. Some  characteristics  of  the  credit
crisis affect directly the financial management of firms; the diminution of products and services sales,  the  difficulties
in growth of firms, the banks restrictions in terms of lend money and the increase of charges to obtain the bank  credit
are some of them.
The trade credit is used by companies to finance their purchases. But, the form to  use  this
financial tool, especially from large firms, is important in financial crisis because it  could  impact
negatively in small firms more than ever, deteriorating their liquidity position and enhancing cash  flow  problems.
Small firms are often suppliers of trade credit, despite the financial complications that this can cause  them.  Although
empirical work has been done previously on trade credit, most of the studies are focused on large firms (Petersen  and
Rajan, 1997; and Ng et al., 1999) and only some of them analyze the use of trade credit from small  firms  perspective
(Wilson & Summer, 2002).
In this sense, the aim of this paper is to establish the use of trade credit practice from small firm’s position  in
credit crunch. Although trade credit helps to promote sales to small and large firms, and support economic  activity,  it
puts suppliers in a vulnerable position  which  damage  specifically  the  financial  sustainability  of  small  firms,  and
consequently their survival. Thus, in this paper the focus is related to these two particular aspects. Firstly, analyze  the
consequences of the use of trade credit in a situation  of  global  credit  crisis,  focusing  our  analysis  in  small  firms.
Secondly, describe the situation in terms of use of trade credit in Europe, and more concretely the situation  of  United
Kingdom in which the government have applied specific measures to reduce the bad consequences of the use of  trade
credit in this crisis,  apart  of  the  voluntary  actions  as  payment  codes  or  “good”  payer’s  rankings.  So,  the  main
contribution of this paper is provide knowledge in trade credit as Paul & Boden (2008) shown as useful in their paper.
Concretely,  in  this  work  we  contribute  in  the  analysis  of  the  form  to  use  the  trade  credit  and  their  financial
consequences to small firms when it is used incorrectly.
Our findings demonstrate that credit crisis could affect negatively the financial situation of  firms;  all  above
small firms’ liquidity is damaged. The average days used in European firms has maintained in the last years,  but  they
are not reduced. In UK, more than in the rest of countries have tried to address the issue and in communicating on  the
use of trade credit.  Although  the  own  regulation  to  large  firms  (Plcs)  about  the  payment  policy,  the  European
Directive to apply interests to deleted payers, and the voluntary actions carry  on  in  UK  promoting  Payment  Codes,
their results in average days to pay suppliers are not reduce in the last years in large firms. It seems an  indication  that
voluntary and compulsory actions, focused on large firms, are not  enough  to  a  reduction  in  the  days  used  to  pay
suppliers. Moreover, our findings demonstrate that the Spanish case is one of the worst in Europe because there are no
public or private actions neither voluntary nor compulsory ones to reduce the used days to pay suppliers.  Furthermore
the government and the public institutions in Spain are clear examples of late payers, so in Spain there are  used  more
days to pay suppliers increasing funding and cash flow problems of firms, in special small and medium firms as  more
vulnerable in this situation.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: in the first section  the  credit  crisis  is  explained  using
supplier’s perspective. The next section provides an overview of previous studies focusing the review of  literature  in
aspects in which the global credit crisis is affecting. This is followed by the empirical results; a descriptive analysis of
the use of the trade credit in Europe showing the situation of Spain, and the  results  in  UK  firms  more  deeply.  This
paper concludes with a discussion of the key findings and the bibliographical references.
2. CREDIT CRISIS FROM A SUPPLIERS PERSPECTIVE
In 2008, after a growth economy period, started the credit crisis that affect all of the countries; but  especially
the most damaged countries are the  most  implicated  in  the  causes,  for  instance  United  States,  United  Kingdom,
Germany, France, Italy or Spain.  The  growth  of  the  previous  economy  was  based  on  corrupted  actions  and  on
speculation investments, and on greed of the people and managers  of  the  most  important  financial  institutions  and
firms, as well. There was a chain of movements interrelated  based  on  the  possibility  to  obtain  easily  money  from
banks and on the speculative investments. Banks, in a complex money market system, lend money as mortgages (sub-
prime mortgages) based on complex financial instruments to individuals and firms acquiring high credit  risks,  which
compensate by packaging  these  bad  mortgages  with  other  mortgages  and  reselling  them  as  “investments”.  The
facilities to obtain easily credits from  banks  makes  to  increase  consume  of  products  and  services,  thus,  increase
demand, prices, and production, as well; it was a Consumer boom. Moreover, the accessibility to obtain credit permits
the purchase of houses and cars, and makes other semi-luxury purchases. But, the main problem was  not  specifically
the use of the credit, the problem based on the form to use it. The credit was not  used  wisely  (for  start  or  expand  a
business or buy necessary houses or cars that increase jobs and growth economies), it was used to  speculation  and  it
was out of control. The crack of some of most  important  and  large  credit  institutions  started  on  September  2008,
because  many  of  them,  with  high  volume  of  risky  mortgage,  could  no  longer  afford   to   extend   new   credit.
Unfortunately, their loans were not bringing in a positive cash flow and they could not lend new money to individuals
and businesses, the main activity of the credit institutions.
The instability of the financial situation because of the credit  crisis  causes  some  changes
and implications to enterprises: the reduction of the demand of products or services, the fall  down
of product  and  services’  prices,  and  consequently,  an  unnecessary  massive  production  in  which  the
economy was based on. It implicates also the lost of miles of jobs. The reduction of  sales  reduces  firms’  cash  flow,
because there is a diminution of cash revenues caused not only for  the  reduction  of  current  sales,  but  also  for  the
liquidity problems of the past  clients  that  have  difficulties  to  pay  their  acquired  goods,  and  the  future  liquidity
problems of the potential clients. So, especially the current, but also the  future  offered  credit  to  clients  involve  the
assumption of high credit risk for companies. In this sense, if suppliers  assume  more  financial  risk  providing  trade
credit for clients than they could support, it probably will result  in  financial  fatal  consequences  for  suppliers.  This
problem increases with the generalization of the trade credit as financial tool, but is now with the credit crisis when  is
widely recognise for the financial consequences  for  suppliers  and  other  stakeholders  in  case  of  clients  delete  or
default their payments.
In this sense, companies could try to stop the effect  of  reduction  in  sales  and  respective
reduction  of  revenues  with  injections  of  liquidity  provided  from  the  financial  entities.   The
problem is that in this crisis situation, the negative cash flow  of  firms  can  not  resolve  with  the
obtaining of external funds as bank  credit,  at  least  in  an  easy  way,  because  of  the  restrictive
position that banks have acquired to extend credit to the companies and individuals. Thus,  current
financial restrictions of credit institutions cause difficulties for obtaining financial funds  on  firms
(see, for example, Kaminsky & Reinhart, 1999; Eichengreen & Rose, 1998; Demirgüç-Kunt et al.,
2006), not only for small and  medium,  but  more  rapidly.  OECD  composite  measures  of  bank
lending indicate that banks are massively restricting their lending to firms,  either  in  the  form  of
increased costs or other restrictions, such as demanding higher levels of collateral (although rather
less in the Euro area than in the US). Moreover, bank credit is likely to decelerate around  banking
crises (Dell’ Ariccia et al., 2008). So, in sum the  accessibility  of  firms  to  affordable  finance  is
difficult. But, the case of small firms is worst, because small firms have to support not only the  problems  relate
to borrow funds from banks, but also the payment policies of  large  companies  which  do  not  have  as  objective  be
quick in their payment with suppliers. This payment behaviour does not help small firm’s financial welfare.
These results could corroborate with real data about the number of  firms  that  are  closing
down  during  the  last  year.  The  death  of  firms,  some  young,  but  others  old,   increases   the
unemployed persons. As many as 50 small businesses are closing every day in UK, (Federation of
Small Business, www.fsb.or.uk, January 2009), and the poll suggests the rate could increase.  Moreover,  liquidity,
solvency and bankruptcy problems in companies  are  appearing.  For  example,  in  UK  last  year,  a  total  of  15,536
companies had to  file  for  insolvency  –  2,586  more  than  in  2007  (www.insolvency.gov.uk).  That  represents  an
increase of 19.94 percent, as compared with a reduction of 5.0  percent  the  year  before.  In  Spain  for  example,  the
situation is worst because last year, a total of 2,092 companies had to file for  insolvency  (more  than  80%  with  less
than 50 employees) –1,262  more  than  in  2007  (www.ine.es).  That  represents  an  increase  of  152.05  percent,  as
compared with a reduction of 2.7 percent the year before.
Small firms in particular, but maybe medium and large ones too, have introduced in a lack of liquidity which
is difficult to resolve without measures or regulation from the governments.
3. REVIEW  OF  LITERATURE:  ETHICAL  POINT  OF  TRADE  CREDIT  AND
ECONOMY THEORIES
Trade credit, a major source of finance for  companies  (Van  Horne  &  Wachowicz,  2001;  Stern  &  Chew,
2003) makes to negotiate and contract directly seller and buyer not only the goods and services, but  also  the  form  to
pay them. Although trade credit helps to promote sales and support economic activity (Meltzer, 1960; Brennan  et  al.,
1988; Petersen & Rajan, 1997), it puts a strain on the resources of suppliers because it  is  the  provision  of  goods  or
services by one company to another in the expectation that payment will be made at some future date. This situation is
more critic in case of small firms because of  the  lack  of  a  strong  credit  risk  analysis  system  or  an  expert  credit
management responsible (Cheng & Pike, 2003), which could get worst their financial situation without expect it.
However, evidence suggests that larger firms are, in aggregate, net credit  providers  (trade
debtors exceed trade creditors) and provide an important financial system for  channelling  finance
down to smaller firms, particularly those rationed by the financial institutions (Storey,  1994;  Peel
et al., 2000; Kohler et al., 2000). But, trade credit contracts by their nature are incomplete, and the
well  done  of  acquired  financial  positions  depends  on  the   information   asymmetries   of   the
contractors. In this sense, although maybe small firms could provide less  net  credit  than  larger  firms  their
credit risk is probably bigger. In fact, the provision of credit from small firms can be a problem for them, because  the
late payment of commercial debt usually precipitates their financial distress and/or constrains their  growth,  which  is
crucial for their survival (Grablowsky, 1984; Kargar & Blumental, 1994).
Walker (1991) and Smith (1987) argued that the state  of  the  economy  influences  on  the
level of accounts receivable. So, the effects of the actual credit crisis could affect or aggravate  the
financial situation of firms, especially the situation of small ones. In this fragile financial  system  situation
the vulnerability and the weak financial position of small firms do not help them in the obtaining of financial funds  to
maintain an effective management of working capital. In this sense,  the  changes  in  trade  and  financial  markets  in
credit crisis make the survival of small firms more difficult than ever, and a generalized use of the trade  credit  is  not
an alternative for them.
One of the effects of actual credit crisis is the down of sales and the difficulties to growth. The trade credit  is
an alternative to increase sales (Schwartz, 1974; Emery, 1987; Brennan et al., 1988; Petersen & Rajan, 1997), but  not
only for small firms, but also for large companies, so all organizations could, at least theoretically  as  Meltzer  (1960)
concluded use more trade credit when the product sales decrease. But firms change their product sales for credit sales.
In this sense firms have to be careful in giving more credit with the aim to increase their  sales,  because  manage  and
offer trade credit is different particularly to small firms without  being  specialist  in  offering  credit  (Cheng  &  Pike,
2003).
The difficulties to obtain funds in the financial system increase with the credit crunch. In this  sense,  Walker
(1991) and Petersen & Rajan (1997) showed that companies that are rationed on credit by the banks are more likely to
take trade credit loans. More concrete, they argued that firms with better access to  capital  markets  offer  more  trade
credit and use less credit from their suppliers. In this sense,  the  trade  credit  could  be  considered  as  a  bank  credit
substitute for some firms (Jaffee, 1971; Schwartz, 1974 and Nilsen, 2002). The substitution of bank credit  with  trade
credit is interesting in case of banks and financial entities apply restrictive policies to lend money, in this situation  the
use of the trade credit increase (Mateut et al., 2006), and it is useful for all firms; small, medium and large  companies
(Meltzer, 1960). But the general use of this financial practice to get funds could increase especially  the  risk  of  small
firms because probably, and with  a  restrictive  financial  situation  concretely,  suppose  the  imposition  of  terms  of
contracts from large firms to small ones, or the lack of commitment in fulfil the  fixed  terms  in  the  contract.  Again,
this practice could be cause difficulties to financial situation of small firms. Regards these  theories,  other  authors  as
Ng et al. (1999) argue that trade credit is given from firms with high liquidity to firms with low liquidity.  In  the  case
that the theory is true and liquidity firms extend credit to firms with liquidity  problems,  the  trade  credit  could  be  a
mechanism to distribute the money, and financial necessities between firms. But, in case that most of firms are in a no
liquidity position the use of trade credit probably is not an instrument to inject liquidity to those firms that need it, it is
more an abusive mechanism of firms that increase their liquidity and financial funds from others with less capacity  to
manage credit, with high necessity to increase sales, or globally to try to survive to a down turn economy.  Peel  et  al.
(2000) suggested that small firms are generally associated with a higher proportion of current  assets  when  compared
to large firms, and that the small firms also have less liquidity, more volatile cash flows and a  reliance  on  short-term
debt. So, the most affected firms are smallest ones and  in  general  their  liquidity  problems  are  higher  than  biggest
firms for the reason that large firms could obtain money, although with more difficulties than before the credit crunch,
from their banks, and they have bigger mechanism to analyze the sales or the credit risk, as well.
In sum, in case that small firms offer more trade credit than ever is because they have not other  choice;  they
are in a worst situation; in which their sales decrease, their  growth  is  stopped  and  they  have  difficulties  to  obtain
funds from others. Thus, the only form that they have to survive without  consideration  of  the  adverse  selection,  so
supposing that their clients are good payers, is offering more trade credit than before the crisis. But it is real  that  they
are assuming an unnecessary financial risk in this situation, because in the case  that  customers  pay  the  products  or
services in the fixed day, or better, as soon as clients get the product this credit risk to suppliers disappear, but it is not
the case in most of the situations. Moreover small firms are not experts in credit  management,  so  the  risk  that  they
support  could  be  much  bigger  than  they  could  expect,  what  it  means  their  financial  distress,  or   worst,   their
bankruptcy, and close.
4. THE USE OF TRADE CREDIT IN THE CREDIT CRUNCH:  A  DESCRIPTIVE
ANALYSIS
4.1. The trade credit in Europe.
Grant Thornton Company makes annually around 7000 interviews to medium size companies about business
management in European countries. One  of  their  analyses  involves  the  payments,  in  particular  the  used  days  in
commercial transactions with suppliers. Furthermore, they use the required ratio  in  Companies  Act  1985,  in  which
instead of use cost of sales, use sales invoices with suppliers (we will explain in a next section the requirement of  this
ratio in large UK firms). The results (See Figure 1) show that the use of number of days  in  trade  credit  decreases  in
Europe in 1999, but then it is constant, around 54  days.  So,  it  seeks  probably  to  think  that  the  last  legislation  of
European Commission (for example 2000/35/EC) and  some  of  the  policies  in  European  Countries  do  not  reduce
significantly the used days to pay suppliers as much as  they  expect  to,  because  they  need  near  of  two  months  in
average to pay suppliers.
Figure 1. Average payment period for sales invoices (days).
Source. Own elaboration with Grant Thornton International Business Report 2007.
Other analysis in term of number of days to pay suppliers has been done  by  Intrum  Justitia.   In  their  2007
European Payment Index (EPI) Report they reflect the opinion of thousands of companies in  25  markets.  “European
business and official bodies lose around 25 billion euros every year because they are obliged  to  finance  unnecessary
credits. To be late in payments to suppliers is a cause of their liquidity problems, which could finish in the bankruptcy
of the firm” (EPI, p.3). The used ratio to calculate the average days to pay suppliers in European Payment Index is not
the required by Companies Act 1985 in UK. They calculate the days to pay suppliers using financial accounts.
In the following table there are represented the average days to pay  suppliers  of  25  countries  in  European
area in 2007. The Nordic countries are the best payers in Europe with  an  average  of  31  days  and  the  worst  payer
countries are Spain (82.6), Portugal (88), Italy (96.9 days), Cyprus  (97.1  days)  and  Greece  (105.9  days).  England-
Wales is the 18th position with a delay payment average of 51.6 days, and Spain is not in a good position because it is
the fourth worst one from the 25 European Countries in 2007.
Table 1. European Payment delay by Country.
|                               |                               |
|EPI                            |EPI                            |
|Payment        |Payment|EPI    |Payment delay|Payment  |EPI    |
|duration.      |duratio|Country|(average     |duration.|Country|
|Intrum Justitia|n.     |Rank   |days)        |Intrum   |Rank   |
|               |Intrum |       |             |Justitia |       |
|               |Justiti|       |             |         |       |
|               |a      |       |             |         |       |
|Norway         |1      |26.4   |Slovakia     |14       |47.3   |
|Finland        |2      |26.7   |Czech        |15       |49.1   |
|               |       |       |Republic     |         |       |
|Estonia        |3      |28.5   |Scotland     |16       |49.3   |
|Denmark        |4      |34.2   |Belgium      |17       |50.2   |
|Latvia         |5      |34.7   |England -    |18       |51.6   |
|               |       |       |Wales        |         |       |
|Sweden         |6      |34.9   |Ireland      |19       |52.2   |
|Iceland        |7      |35.8   |France       |20       |65.3   |
|Netherlands    |8      |40.3   |Spain        |21       |82.6   |
|Lithuania      |9      |43.7   |Portugal     |22       |88     |
|Poland         |10     |44.1   |Italy        |23       |96.9   |
|Switzerland    |11     |44.7   |Cyprus       |24       |97.1   |
|Hungary        |12     |45.1   |Greece       |25       |105.9  |
|Germany        |13     |46.5   |
Source: European Payment Index (EPI).
Among the European Union  and  other  Western  European  countries,  Nordic  countries  dominate  the  top
scorers in the 2007 with Denmark and Finland leading  the  overall  ranking.  These  European  countries  are  quicker
payers comparing with the rest, in particular with Portugal, Italy, Cyprus, Greece and  Spain,  probably  because  their
payment culture is different and they have high responsibility and fixed commitments  in  relation  to  the  payment  to
suppliers. However, it is interesting to mention that in Europe  there  is  a  directive  (2000/35/EC)  that  regulates  the
payment to suppliers in terms of used day to pay them and in terms of punish with interest charges deleted pays.  Each
of  European  country  has  the  obligation  to  develop  this  directive  to  get  harmonization  in   payment.   But,   this
harmonization is difficult because each country could develop in their law  the  directive  requirements  depending  on
their interests, circumstances, culture or behaviour in terms of payments, because some aspects are open to do that.
4.2. The trade credit in United Kingdom.
Although beyond credit crisis the initiatives of UK government take more effort  than  ever,  in  1991  started
some voluntary and public policies with the aim to reduce the negative impact of the use of  trade  credit  in  firms,  in
particular in small ones because they are more affected by this payment practice in a negative way.
Voluntary Payment Policy Initiatives:
Confederation  of  British  Industry  (CBI)  developed  a  payment  code  called  “Prompt   payers:   in   good
company” that started operating  in  November  1991.  A  further  development  in  1997  was  the  publication  of  the
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) document “Better Payment Practice”, which contains guidance about  giving
and taking trade credit. This superseded the CBI code. This second  voluntary  code  is  more  direct  and  clear.  More
recently, in December  2008  the  Institute  of  Credit  Management  (ICM),  on  behalf  of  Department  for  Business,
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR), has developed a further  version  of  “Prompt  Payment  Code”,  which  is
focused on  three  main  areas:  a  commitment  to  pay  suppliers  on  time;  giving  clear  guidance  to  suppliers;  and
encouraging good payment practice. One of the most important actions around this new version of the payment  codes
is that the summit follows a commitment by central Government to pay its suppliers  within  ten  days,  and  that  it  is
focused on good practice examples and discussed in detail what measures should be adopted  to  ensure  suppliers  are
paid on time.
Compulsory Payment Policy Initiatives:
Apart of these voluntary initiatives there are some regulations in terms of payment to  suppliers.  Concretely,
Plcs (and Plc subsidiaries which qualify as ‘large’ companies) were required to disclose their  policy  on  the  payment
of trade creditors in the United Kingdom[1] by the Companies Act 1985. The “Policy on  the  Payment  of  Creditors”
(Part VI) establishes that companies should settle the terms of payment  with  suppliers  when  agreeing  the  terms  of
each transaction, ensure that those suppliers are made aware of the terms of payment, and abide by those terms. These
aspects of the Companies Act have been active since 1997. Furthermore, it is now a requirement[2] that the  directors’
report should make a quantitative statement relating the amount outstanding to suppliers to the  total  invoiced  during
the year:
|No. of days     (DR)               =     Trade creditors value at the |
|end of the year       x 365                                           |
|Aggregate amount invoiced by suppliers during the year                |
This  latter  figure  gives  an  insight  into  company  practice,  to  complement  the   policy
statements they might also make. This requirement permit to  external  analysts  use  a  ratio  more
close to the reality in terms of days that use the firm to pay supplier, because without  the  disclose
in the Directors’ Report about the number of days to pay supplier, the only  form  to  calculate  the
days is using the annual  accounts  (Balance  Sheet  and  P&L  Accounts),  accountability  ratio  of
payment days to suppliers.
|No. of days (Proxy)                =     Trade creditors value|
|at the end of the year       x 365                            |
|Cost of Sales                                                 |
There is also,  some  regulation  on  combating  late  payment  in  commercial  transactions
started forcing in 1998 in UK to reduce the effects of late payments. Firstly, The Late Payment  of
Commercial Debts (Interest) Act was introduced on 1st November 1998 to  encourage  purchasers
to pay on time by giving businesses the right to claim  interest  if  another  business  pays  its  bills
late. Previously, businesses were only able to claim interest on late paid debts if it was included in
the contract  or  if  they  pursued  the  debt  through  the  courts  and  the  courts  awarded  interest.
Secondly, on 8  August  2000,  Directive  2000/35/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on
combating late payment in commercial transactions was published in the Official Journal L 200. This  Directive  is  in
favour of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and the focus of the European Parliament is to deal with the  problem
of late payment. If the customer does not pay the day fixed  in  the  contract,  or  in  case  that  the  date  or  period  for
payment is not fixed in the contract in 30 days following the date of receipt of the invoice or the date of receipt of  the
goods or services, the debtor is obliged to pay a “penalty interest”.
Following some of the results around UK payment situation is shown.  The  average  payment  days  that  Plc
firms in UK are required to show in their Annual Report (Directors’ Report) increase in the last years  from  42  to  46
days (See Figure 3). The large firms in UK use 4 days more in 2008 comparing with the days used in 2007. There  are
different  payment  policies,  not  only  voluntaries  (payment  codes),  but  also  compulsories  (Companies   Act   and
regulations), but if the aim of these policies is to  reduce  the  days  that  the  largest  firms  in  UK  used  to  pay  their
supplier the made effort is not enough, or the results in terms of reduction of days to pay  need  more  time  to  change
because of the need of payment culture change. But, it is real that some of the  actions  are  not  new,  they  have  been
operative 10 years, a period enough big to impact in firm’s society and change their payment systems  with  suppliers.
The real impact of an abusive use of trade credit has  not  show  before.  It  is  now  when  firms  in  UK  are  showing
externally the financial worst consequences of the culture to pay late,  because  with  the  credit  crisis  in  which  it  is
difficult to compensate their liquidity needs with other external funds and their sales decrease, their financial situation
downturn rapidly, without any possibility to stop it.
Currently, more than the middle of large firms are using more than  40  days  to  pay  suppliers,  and  20%  of
them use more than 70 days (See Figure 2), but around 53% of the sample uses less than 40 days to pay suppliers  and
36% of the sample less than 30 days, a significant data. The payment policies  with  the  support  of  banks  and  firms
association as Federation of Small Businesses (FSB) or Confederation of British Industry (CBI) are  trying  to  reduce
the days used to pay suppliers to 10 days, but only a 6.77% of Plc firms already use 10  or  less  than  10  days  to  pay
suppliers, thus the change in the reduction of days used to pay suppliers have  not  to  be  easy.  For  the  moment,  the
Government and some association as Universities have accepted this initiative, and they have committed to pay in  10
or less days to suppliers.
Figure 2. Average number of days used to pay suppliers (Directors’ Report Proxy): UK Plc firms in 2008.
Mean 2006/2007: 42 days
Mean 2007/2008: 46 days
Source. Own elaboration using the data in Payment League Table of ICMR.
FTSE Sample
The sample used in this study was taken from FTSE All-Share data (31 October of 2007). We  have  selected
100% of FTSE 100  firms[3],  20%  of  FTSE  250  firms  (randomly  using  systematic  method)  and  14%  of  FTSE
SmallCap (randomly using systematic method). Data were  collected  by  means  directly  of  their  Annual  Report  or
Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) database. The sample is significant at 95% level with an error of 3.77% and it
takes approximately the 85% of capitalization of UK firms, and represents statistically  the  UK  firm  population  (see
Table 2).
Table 2. Technical characteristics of the study
|UNIVERSE              |UK Firms. FTSE All-Share Constituents &         |
|                      |Weightings (100, 250, SmallCap)                 |
|SAMPLE                |200 firms                                       |
|SAMPLING              |Systematic random probabilistic sample          |
|TARGET GROUP          |FTSE firms with payment policy in Annual Report |
|                      |(Directors’ Report)                             |
|DATA                  |The data of firms have been taken of Annual     |
|                      |Report of FTSE firms 2007 and FAME Database in  |
|                      |2007                                            |
|TECHNIQUE             |Review of Annual Reports 2007                   |
|DATE PERFORMED        |Field work was carried out on November 2007     |
|                      |(choose sample and collect available 2007 Annual|
|                      |Reports) and November 2008 (collect the rest of |
|                      |2007 Annual Reports, review data comparing      |
|                      |information in Annual Reports and FAME,  and    |
|                      |clean the sample)                               |
|MARGIN OF ERROR       |Em= ± 3.77% with a confidence level of 95%,     |
|                      |p=q=0.5, for overall data                       |
We have analyzed the progress since the regulation started to be operative in 1997 (Companies Act 1985)  to
2007. The average days from 1998 to 2007 used for FTSE firms in UK are around 60 days (See  Figure  3).  However,
comparing the days in 1998 with the days in 2007 using the Proxy,  (the  ration  between  trade  creditors  and  cost  of
sales), in 2007 firms are using 13 days more than in 1998, there is an  increase  in  used  days  to  pay  suppliers.  This
results indicate that the effort, not only voluntary but also compulsory ones, from Europe and  from  UK  Government
are not enough to reduce used days to pay  suppliers.  However,  the  UK  culture,  as  we  could  see  following  is  so
different to Spanish one, in which the  null  payment  policies  make  a  big  different  in  terms  of  used  days  to  pay
suppliers comparing not only with UK but also with most of European countries.
Figure 3. Average days in trade credit (using the Proxy) from 1998 to 2007: UK FTSE case.
In addition, the liquidity problems of UK firms increase because the availability to credit banking and capital
markets has reduced with the credit crunch. The  results  of  the  survey  made  by  Confederation  of  British  Industry
(CBI) to analyze the situation of firms in  UK  in  terms  of  credit  conditions  show  the  availability  problem  to  get
external funds. The used sample in 2009 is 113 firms of difference size, small and medium  (0-240  employees),  large
(250-4999 employees) and very large (more than 5000 employees). The results show that eight in ten very large firms
reported deterioration in credit availability, and 63% of small and  medium-sized  enterprises  and  over  half  of  large
businesses have experienced  a  reduction  in  credit  availability  since  the  beginning  of  the  credit  crunch.  So,  the
availability of credit to the corporate sector has worsened over the past quarter, and  over  the  next  months  a  further
similar deterioration in the availability  of  credit  is  expected.  Moreover,  the  weak  accessibility  to  external  funds
impact directly in business activity because six in ten businesses have stopped their plans  for  capital  investment  and
nearly two fifths have been forced to cut jobs.
4.3. The trade credit in Spain.
In Spain the directive 2000/35/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  29  June  2000  on
combating late payment in commercial transactions was established with  the  following  law:  Ley  3/2004  of  29/XII
(BOE 30-XII). Continuing with the European directive, the Spanish law about late  payment  limits  the  used  days  to
pay suppliers and the law develops a regulation to use interests to punish deleted payments. The days to pay  suppliers
are 30 days in general terms following the date of receipt by the debtor  of  the  invoice  or  an  equivalent  request  for
payment, but the directive permits to European members to modify in specific terms these days, so in Spain  there  are
permitted for example the use of 60 days in case of public administration payments, or in  case  of  the  used  payment
documents (cheques, notes and drafts) firms could use more days to pay. The Spanish law is not very restrictive and if
the aim of the European directive is the harmonization of  payments  in  European  countries  to  change  the  payment
culture, the payment behaviour in Spain has not been any significant change with the  law.  So,  for  the  moment,  the
directive throughout the Spanish law has established the regulation to charge interests in case of delete  the  payments.
So, in general, the payment behaviour in Spain is not very different than before the law but the suppliers could use the
law as an instrument to reinforce their negotiation position when distributors want to postpone payments.
To analyze Spanish  case  we  have  used  the  exploratory  data  in  BACH  Database.  The
database was set up in 1987, in co-operation with  the  European  Committee  of  Central  Balance
Sheet Data Offices ECCB, and they use  non-financial  firms  from  different  countries  (Belgium,
Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Portugal, USA and Japan)  to  make
their study. We have analyzed the evolution of payment days from 1997 to 2007 in Spain.
The used days in Spanish firms to pay are more than 79 days  for  all  of  the  analyzed  period
(See Figure 4). Moreover, in the year in which the Spanish late payment law started, 2004, it is  not  any  reduction  in
the days used by firms to pay their transactions, neither in the following  years.  The  average  days  used  in  Spain  in
2007 are near of 82, so, Spanish  firms  instead  of  use  a  month  to  pay  commercial  transactions,  as  the  European
Parliament try to establish with the directive, they use near of 3  months.  The  reasons  to  the  difference  in  payment
days could be diverse, but the permissible Spanish juridical system permit the use  of  more  days  to  pay  commercial
transactions, with the bad  consequences  to  suppliers’  cash  flow,  specially  in  case  to  use  the  suppliers  firms  as
financiers when their cost in permitting delete payments are bigger than the cost of clients to pay good and services in
the terms of the contract, and no later than 30 days.
Figure 4. Payment delay (average days) in Spain.
In financial restrictive situations, as in the present credit crisis, the consequences of  this  payment  practices,
delete  payments  to  suppliers,  worse  the  cash  flow  problems  and  liquidity  difficulties  of  suppliers,   and   more
significantly when they are small of medium firms. In Spain the “Camaras de Comercio” has made a questionnaire  to
400 Spanish firms with less than 249 employees to analyze the financial situation of SMEs in 2009. The results  show
that  the  financial  flow  has  reduce  in  more  than  the  middle  of  the  SMEs,  the  external  financing  charges   and
commission are increase in the last year for two in three of firms, the  guaranties  and  warrants  increase  for  71%  of
questioned firms and a 25% have to add personal warranties to get funds, and  the  devolution  period  is  shorter  than
before. These results in addition to an increase in the payment periods of clients in near  of  80%  of  SMEs  show  the
liquidity problems in which these firms are immerse. Furthermore, the government actions are not focused on a  direct
financing help of SMEs for the moment.
4.4. Comparing Europe; UK and Spain: B2C, B2B and Public Sector.
Using the Intrum Justitia data of the last year, from 2005 to 2008 which makes an analysis in European firms
about the payment to suppliers the comparison in same terms is possible. The following figure  (Figure  5)  shows  the
results about the used days in business to consumer (B2C), business to business (B2B) and Public  Sector  (Public)  in
relation to the used days to pay suppliers in European countries, UK and Spain.
Figure 5. B2C, B2B and Public Sector: used days to pay suppliers in Europe; UK and Spain:
|                                               |                                              |
|                                                                                              |
In three cases (B2C, B2B and Public Sector) the  Spanish  situation  is  the  worst  in  terms  of  pay  quickly.
Spanish firms use more days to pay consumers, concretely 16 days  more  than  the  average  used  days  in  European
Countries and 7 days more comparing with UK case. In  case  of  payments  between  firms,  the  Spanish  case  is  the
worst, because Spanish firms use 34 days more than the rest of European countries and 38 days more  than  UK  firms
to pay other firms. But, the biggest gap is around payment of public sector, the payment behaviour between Spain and
the rest of countries is different because the differentiation in days is near to 96 days  in  case  of  compare  Spain  and
UK public sectors, and 79 days in case of compare Spain and European public sector. So, in Spain in general are  used
more days to pay commercial transactions, but the differentiation in Spanish  public  sector’s  payment  is  the  biggest
one because in Spain the public sector use near of 5 months to pay suppliers when in the  rest  of  European  countries
are used 3 months less, and in UK 4 months less. Moreover, the progress of the used days in  the  last  4  years  shows
that there is a continues increase in the used days in Spanish case in public sector and  business  to  business  payment
operations, but no in business to consumer operations. The average used days in Europe and  UK  are  similar  or  few
days in the last four years in these three payment categories (B2C, B2B and Public Sector).
In  this  sense,  these  results  corroborate  previous  ones.  It  is  obvious  that  in   different
countries the used days are different and some of the most important characteristics  could  be  the
payment culture or behaviour and the payment policies or  actions,  and  regulation.  In  Spain  the  payment
culture is different comparing with UK and with the average used days in European countries, so the Spanish situation
in terms of payment days is worst. Moreover, these differences  show  that  the  gap  in  Spain  comparing  with  other
countries is  bigger  in  terms  of  be  quick  payers  and  the  regulation  and  the  public  payment  activities  not  only
compulsory ones, but also voluntary ones could be a developed aspects in the future if the aim is the reduction of used
days to pay suppliers, to improve the cash flow of firms, specially small and medium ones to support  the  survival  of
the Spanish business network. But, at least, as important as the necessary change in the payment behaviour in general,
is the change of the behaviour specifically in public sector  in  Spain,  the  worst  one  in  terms  of  used  days  to  pay
suppliers in Europe.
CONCLUSIONS
This study analyzes in a descriptive way the use of trade  credit  in  the  last  years  because  of  the  financial
consequences to small firms based on the massive use of trade credit of large firms. With the  credit  crunch  the  cash
flow problems increase, more intensively in case of small and medium firms, what it means insolvency, or even worst
bankruptcy of firms.
This paper contributes to the debate by providing further evidence of the situation of  payments  to  suppliers
in terms of days in Europe, and specifically in UK and Spain. Firstly, we show the financial consequences  of  the  use
of trade credit, and specifically in credit crisis, and how UK government  develop  voluntary  and  compulsory  public
payment practices to try to reduce liquidity problems or financial distress and  bankruptcy  in  worst  cases.  Secondly,
we study the situation of European countries in terms of payment to suppliers, and in particular the  cases  of  UK  and
Spain in which the gap in terms of used days to pay suppliers are so different. This research is particularly  interesting
due to the recent changes in the accessibility to external financing in actual credit crunch.
In  this  sense,  in  the  financial  crisis,  the  availability  of  credit  and  credit  rationing  due  to  their  heavy
dependence on bank credit affects particularly SME firms of all European countries. However, it is clear that in  some
countries, as Nordic ones the use of the trade credit is less than in the rest of countries, and in other countries as in UK
the public initiatives, not only voluntaries  but  also  compulsory  initiatives  are  different.  The  effort  made  by  UK,
although the results are not significant in the progress but they are different in  the  comparison  with  other  countries.
So, the results show a different public payment policy in UK in which the payment behaviour of firms is a  significant
characteristic.
In Spain the differences in terms of payment days are big comparing  with  European  countries,  even  if  we
compare with UK. The weak juridical system could be a reason to a more use of the trade credit. In Spain as  in  other
European countries as Portugal or Greece the juridical system is not strong, what could suppose an extend  use  of  the
trade credit. In Nordic countries, in which the juridical system is more rude the use of trade credit is less.
Finally, there is a clear government implication in the cause in UK, and more with the credit  crisis  situation,
because they are trying to reduce as much as possible the used days to pay suppliers. In Spain the actions  in  terms  of
payment policies are inexistent. The results indicate that UK government and other public institutions are  acquiring  a
commit to pay in less than ten days, in Spain this action does not seem possible  because  the  government  and  public
administration is the first one that use more than the average days that the rest of firms to pay their suppliers.  In  sum,
we could say that Spanish policy is passive and UK policy is totally active.
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[1] SI (Statutory Instrument) 1996/189.
[2] Companies Act 1985 (Directors’ Report) (Statement of Payment Practice) Regulations 1997.
[3] There are other three  firms  Resolution,  Umbro  and  Scottish  and  Newcastle  without  access  to  their  Annual  Report  2007  because  of  the
acquisition by others (Resolution  has  being  acquired  by  Pearls  Group,  Umbro  has  being  acquired  by  Nike  and  Scottish  and  Newcastle  by
Heineken).
